The STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) economy has been defined by top-down categorizations of occupations by experts. This study takes a bottom-up approach, directly asking a national sample of workers to self-classify their jobs as STEM or not. We identify a sizeable group of workers in what we call the "periphery STEM workforce," who report working STEM jobs outside of traditional STEM occupations.
In this paper, we put forth the hypothesis that a significant proportion of women's participation in the STEM workforce is obscured by how the STEM workforce is operationally defined. To date, measurement of the STEM workforce by the federal government and think tanks has relied on top-down classifications of occupations by federal agencies. These definitions are based on what typical workers do in each occupation, and thus ignore potential variation across workers within an occupation as well as recent developments and newly emerging jobs.
Consider an occupation where 90 percent of the workers within that occupation are not involved in STEM-specific tasks. In this case, all workers in this occupation would be classified as non-STEM. However, this leaves 10 percent of the workers who are doing STEM tasks but are nonetheless excluded from official determinations of the size of the STEM workforce. Many healthcare workers, technicians, and teachers (particularly those of STEM subjects) apply STEM skills and concepts in their daily jobs but are classified per their occupation as non-STEM. If women are differentially located in STEM jobs within non-STEM occupations, then measuring the STEM workforce by occupation codes will underrepresent women's presence and potentially misdiagnose policy problems.
To address this limitation, we measured STEM jobs from the bottom up, by asking workers directly whether they consider the work they do on a daily basis to be STEM. These questions were included in a new survey that we fielded to a nationally representative sample of working adults. We then used information on the workers' occupations to construct traditional occupation-based STEM classifications. the "periphery STEM workforce." We investigate whether ignoring the periphery STEM workforce creates a distorted view of supply and demand in an economy that increasingly blends STEM skills and knowledge into many occupations.
To preview our survey results, we estimate that the periphery STEM workforce (cell b)
contains 10 to 12 percent of all workers. Most of these periphery STEM workers are women. For example, when using the U.S. Census Bureau's occupation-based classification, 22 percent of men with STEM bachelor's degrees work in a STEM occupation, compared to only 15 percent of women with STEM bachelor's degrees. These differences are even more pronounced when using the Brookings Institution's task-based classification of STEM occupations (both definitions are described in detail later), where 58 percent of men with a STEM bachelor's degree work in a high STEM or super STEM occupation, compared to only 34 percent of women. However, when using self-reports of STEM jobs from our survey, the rates of remaining in STEM jobs among STEM graduates are much higher and nearly equal across genders: 71 percent for men and 72 percent for women.
We also explore whether there are wage differences among workers who occupy different classifications in the workforce (i.e. different cells in Figure 1 ). We find that men earn more if working in any form of STEM work, particularly cells (c) and (d) in Figure 1 , but that this is not true for women in cell (b), the periphery STEM workforce. We do not attempt to fully account for selection into types of work. We simply model wages using a Heckman selection model to account for selection into employment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides more precise definitions used throughout the paper and describes the methods we will employ to measure the periphery STEM workforce. Section III describes the data from the American Life Panel. Section IV presents the results, which we discuss in the concluding Section V.
II. Methods

A. Defining the STEM Workforce
Available documentation indicates that the STEM acronym originated within the National Science Foundation in the 1990s, where it was initially coined as "SMET" before the order was rearranged to become STEM (Lund and Schenk 2010) . This change foreshadowed additional efforts to refine and strengthen the concept of STEM, including this paper. We compare and contrast two existing methods of classifying STEM employment before introducing a third, new method. The three methods have subtle differences that turn out to have major implications for who is and who is not considered part of the STEM workforce.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines an occupation as "a set of activities or tasks that employees are paid to perform. Employees that perform essentially the same tasks are [grouped] in the same occupation, whether or not they work in the same industry" (BLS 2018). We define a job as the specific work arrangement of a given individual, including the exact tasks they The two existing methods of identifying the STEM workforce assess STEM qualities at different levels, by considering an occupation holistically or by considering tasks and skills which then are combined with varying weights into different occupations. Our approach is slightly different from either one, asking individuals to look holistically at the tasks and skills they personally perform. Thus, respondents to our survey do not assess the tasks they do one by one, and they do not average over all the people that are in their occupation. Most important, our approach allows for some individuals within an occupation, or who perform certain combinations of tasks and skills, to self-define as using STEM, while others in that occupation, or using a similar combination of tasks and skills, to self-define their work as not using STEM. However, the Census classification is used throughout federal agencies and by many researchers to officially measure the size of the STEM workforce for policy purposes.
A.2 Task-Based Occupation Classification: The Brookings Institution Approach
In response to criticisms that the U.S. Census Bureau's approach does not consider variation in the extent to which STEM skills and concepts are utilized on the job, and overly relies on the subjective beliefs of the rating task forces, the Brookings Institution created a classification system (Rothwell 2013 government has directed far less money to build the educational pipeline to these hidden STEM jobs, which are concentrated in manufacturing, health care, and construction industries (Rothwell 2013) . A task-based approach has the potential to reduce traditional biases regarding what occupations or work activities are considered to be STEM, especially as they relate to gender, and indeed this approach classifies slightly greater proportion of women as STEM workers (we examine differences in more detail below).
A.3 Holistic Job Classification: RAND ALP Approach
The third approach to classifying the STEM workforce is to directly survey workers and ask if their jobs are STEM. We execute this approach by administering a survey to a nationally- This approach allows for individuals to reply about the nature of their job as they experience it each day. Respondents also provided their occupation from among the 539 Census occupations, allowing us to classify them by both the Census and Brookings approaches. Even if the occupation they work in rises above the threshold for a STEM classification for the typical worker, the respondent may do fewer STEM-related tasks, and vice versa for non-STEM occupations. These types of disagreements may vary by gender, and our approach allows us not only to measure the occupations where men and women are working, but which jobs they take within occupations. 8
B. Research questions and empirical approach
Given these three approaches, we investigate the following questions.
1. How does self-reported STEM job classification differ from the existing occupation-based classifications? (size of the periphery STEM workforce)
2. Are women and men differentially sorted into the periphery STEM workforce?
(composition of the periphery STEM workforce)
3. Conditional on worker and job characteristics, is there any observed wage benefit or a wage penalty for working in the periphery STEM workforce? (validating the market importance of the periphery versus core STEM workforce concept)
To answer the first questions, we display cross-tabulations and descriptive figures from our survey data. To answer the second question, we display descriptive statistics as well as multiple regression results weighing the characteristics associated with working in the periphery STEM workforce. To answer the third question, we model earnings using a simple regression of wages on observable characteristics of workers and jobs, as well as on STEM classifications.
III. Data
The RAND American Life Panel (ALP) is a nationally sampled internet panel (with noninternet users provided with a computer and internet connection) that permits generalization to the non-institutionalized population of adults in the United States. The panel receives periodic surveys on different topics as well as a standard module on household characteristics fielded every quarter. There are approximately 6,000 panel participants overall; however, not all are invited to participate in each survey. In our analysis we focus on a subset of respondents who were randomly sampled for recruitment into the panel. Pollard and Baird (2017) respondents to the occupation question. Given our focus on the employed workforce, we limited the sample to adults under the age of 65. Of the remaining 2,707 respondents, 1,898 were employed, and of these, 1,694 reported an occupation. We merged responses from MS436 and MS480, yielding 1,494 respondents in the focal demographic group who both had a reported an occupation in MS436 and answered the question about STEM job in MS480. Note that we also draw respondent demographic data from ALP MS480.
We constructed this sample in order to measure STEM job classifications in three distinct ways for the same workers at the same point in time. However, because these two surveys were administered two years apart, mismatches in classifications could be driven respondents changing jobs between surveys. To limit the effects of these changes, we limited the sample further. A broadly defined measure of occupation was observed in both MS436 and MS480, comprised of 23 major Census occupation codes rather than the 539 we use in the analysis. We excluded 439 more workers who changed broad occupations between surveys. Our final sample size for the analysis was 1,055. We believe our 2015 STEM occupation classification for the final sample is likely to be accurate for up to 98% of the respondents. This estimate comes from a parallel analysis we conducted using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) across the same time period (shown in Appendix A). In this analysis of the SIPP, we found that just 1 to 2 percent of workers whose broad occupation group was constant between 2015 and 2017 changed STEM occupation status between those two years.
The final 1,055 respondents are weighted to match the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Appendix B describes the weighting procedure, and our procedures to account for some itemwise missing data. Table 1 gives us our first look at the size of the STEM workforce, which ranged from 6 percent of workers using the Census approach to 27 percent of workers using Brookings' approach. Meanwhile, our approach using self-reports yielded an estimate in between the two, at around 20 percent. Thus, in our data we have a sample of a few hundred STEM workers to examine differences in classifications, and how these differences relate to individual characteristics and employment outcomes.
IV. Results
A. How does self-reported STEM job classification differ from the existing occupation-based classifications?
To address our first research question, we used our ALP sample to cross-tabulate multiple approaches in Table 1 . The rows identify the two existing approaches, and the columns identify our approach. The four cells within each of the two panels sum to 100%. The periphery STEM workforce is shaded in gray.
The total size of the periphery STEM workforce (shaded) missed by traditional approaches was 15.8% of all workers by the Census approach and 9.4% of all workers by the Brookings approach. These are substantial proportions of workers, and particularly of STEM workers.
Contrasting our approach with the Census approach, there were almost four times as many workers in the STEM periphery than in the core STEM (bottom right cell, 4.0 percent) and far more even the total official STEM (bottom row, 4.0 percent plus an additional 1.7 percent in the other off-diagonal). And contrasting our approach with the Brookings approach, the STEM periphery was estimated to be approximately the same size as the core STEM workforce. 
B. Are women and men differentially sorted into the periphery STEM workforce?
To analyze gender balance, we calculated the proportion of women in the STEM workforce using the three classification approaches in Figure 2 . We evaluated these proportions for three different populations of workers: all workers, workers with any postsecondary credential in a STEM field (including associate's degrees, certificates, and bachelor's degrees), and workers with a bachelor's degree or higher in a STEM field.
Across all levels of education, there were clear differences between our self-reported job measure and the top-down approaches used by the Census and Brookings (see Figure 2 ). Using our bottom-up approach, we see there was near parity between the genders, especially for those with STEM postsecondary credentials, where confidence intervals indicate balance between men and women. When using the Census definition or either of the Brookings' definitions, there were significantly more men in STEM at all education levels, with about a three-to-one ratio for all workers and around a two-to-one ratio for post-secondary STEM degree holders. By all measures, the bars rise from left to right, showing that women are better represented in the STEM workforce as education increases, reflecting the overall trend that women are advancing in some fields and earning more high-level degrees than men. Next, we performed cross-tabulations of the STEM and non-STEM classifications reported in Table 2 by gender. The size of the periphery STEM workforce was larger for women than for men, especially when using the Brookings classification, where 11.4% of women were estimated to be in the periphery STEM workforce, compared to 7.8% of men. This difference became even more pronounced as a percentage of all workers reporting being in a STEM job. For men in the Brookings classification, about 38 percent of all STEM job holders were in the periphery, whereas for women, about 61 percent of all STEM job holders were in the periphery. While not of primary focus, we also note in Table 3 that not only were men much less likely to be in periphery STEM economy, they were much more likely to be in the periphery non-STEM economy, that is, on the other off-diagonal working non-STEM jobs in STEM occupations. To give concrete examples of the sources of these discrepancies, Table 3 reports the 15 most common occupations for men and women in the periphery STEM workforce, contrasted with the Brookings STEM classification only. For example, we found that 11 percent of all women in the periphery STEM economy were working in "Miscellaneous Healthcare Support
Occupations", which Brookings classifies as non-STEM. Only 4.6 percent of all women in the sample worked in this occupation group, which supports that we are not just identifying the more common occupations but producing a new and meaningful definition of jobs within occupations.
For women, the industries that contributed most to discordance across classification schemes were healthcare and education. Health care support workers, social workers, counselors, educators, dental hygienists, and librarians all appeared in the periphery. For men, the occupations most represented in the periphery seem to be comprised of a different set: occupations such as managers, postsecondary instructors, law clerks, and salespersons. The occupations here that stand out as less traditionally STEM-related (truck drivers for men, customer service for women) serve to emphasize that individuals perform (or perceive that they perform) STEM jobs across a wide array of occupations. Estimates weighted to match CPS 2015.
To complete our analysis of gender differences, we estimated regression models predicting membership in the periphery STEM workforce. The results from these linear probability models are presented in Table 4 . We limited the sample to those who reported being in STEM jobs, and then we created an indicator for being outside a Brookings STEM occupation. The model reports the increased probability of being in cell (b) rather than cell (d) in Figure 1 , associated with various characteristics. This was strictly an exploratory analysis, and so we had no specific hypotheses about our covariates. Model 1 included only a parameter for gender. Model 2 added in a set of other demographic characteristics. Model 3 included an interaction of gender and the additional demographic characteristics to determine whether any traits are more predictive for being in the periphery STEM workforce for women than for men.
Across all models, gender was a salient characteristic predicting membership in the STEM periphery among STEM job holders. The gender gap of 23 percentage points widened to 30
percentage points when other characteristics were added (Model 2). We also found that being a minority increased the probability of being in the periphery substantially, while having a STEM degree decreased the probability substantially. Interactions of gender with other demographic characteristics (Model 3) did not show any statistically significant interactions between gender and these demographic characteristics, meaning that the gender gaps are relatively consistent across demographic groups. However the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that men were even more likely to follow the large demographic shifts away from the periphery, denoted by non-minority status and STEM degree holding, than were women. It is unclear whether women's overrepresentation in the periphery STEM workforce should be concerning. One concern is if women's STEM skills are poorly compensated relative to men's skills, and this is not attributable to differences in preferences for types of work. Our data do not give much purchase on removing bias from selection into jobs, but we investigate differences in wages more broadly, in the periphery versus non-periphery STEM workforce.
We estimated regressions predicting log wages, controlling for individual and job characteristics, and included indicators for STEM classifications of different types. The base reference group for each gender was workers in the core non-STEM workforce. We present the findings without controls, then with controls added, and with controls plus a Heckman correction for selection into the paid labor market. The Heckman selection regression uses as additional selection variables: number of dependents and the interaction of number of dependents with gender. This is a common choice for the excluded instruments in a Heckman selection regression, with the assumption that women with dependents are more likely to not be in the labor force (as some choose to primarily raise their children while outside of the labor force), while men are more likely to be in the labor force when having dependents (feeling additional pressure perhaps to provide for their dependents). The key assumption is that having dependents has no direct effects on earnings outside of the effect through entry into the labor force. Table 5 presents the regression results.
For both women and men, working in the core STEM workforce (STEM job in STEM occupation) was associated with greater wages. This was especially true for women. For example, in the two-state Heckman selection model (Model 3), the core STEM workforce participation coefficient is 0.725 in log wages for women and 0.536 for men. Using Kennedy's (1981) transformation, this is equivalent to 105 percentage points, or about a doubling of earnings for women comparing core non-STEM workforce to core STEM workforce, and about a 69 percent increase for men.
For men, there was a significant increase in wages when working in the periphery non-STEM workforce. This did not appear to be the case for women, although we cannot reject equality of the coefficient for women and for men on periphery non-STEM work. For women, there were statistically significant gains over non-STEM workers only if they work in STEM jobs in STEM occupations. The increase in wages was also statistically different from being in either periphery workforce. There were no observable wage increases for working in the periphery STEM workforce over working in the core non-STEM workforce, either for men or for women. Therefore, the substantial number of periphery STEM workers, who are predominantly women, do not appear to be reaping a benefit from using their STEM skills and training in non-STEM occupations. Women benefit from their STEM skills and training only if they pursue traditionally-classified STEM occupations.
Conclusion
The increasing demand for workers with the skills to undertake quantitative analysis and complex problem-solving across all parts of the economy has elevated the focus on STEM education and STEM employment in the United States. Because a core policy focus is the expansion and promotion of STEM education and training to meet this demand, it is essential to understand the broader contours of the STEM workforce both in terms of its size and composition. This paper pursues that goal using a new approach to determine who is in the STEM workforce. In contrast to traditional top-down classification approaches that emphasize occupations, we created a bottom-up approach based on how workers appraise the application of STEM skills and concepts to their own jobs.
Our approach is more sensitive to variation across workers, though it would be possible to dig deeper by measuring on the level of each task rather than the job as a whole. It is also up-tothe-minute, reflecting the status of STEM work in 2017 without requiring reclassification of new occupations by boards of experts. Given the rapid changes in technology, STEM work will continue to be a moving target (Deming and Noray 2018; Ikudo et al. 2018 ).
Our survey yielded three new insights into the STEM workforce. Summarizing our three core findings, we first discovered that there is a sizeable group of workers (ranging from 10% to 15% of the workforce) in what we call the "periphery STEM workforce." Second, we found that women are more likely than men to be in this periphery STEM workforce. When determining the size of the STEM workforce using self-reports from the RAND ALP, men and women were equally likely to be in the STEM workforce. Third, we found that the most marked wage increases accrue to workers in the core STEM workforce. Outside the core, we found that women with a background in STEM who work in the STEM periphery earn about the same as women with a background in STEM who work in non-STEM occupations.
While there exists a rich body of literature documenting gender disparities in pay, even for the same jobs, our research elucidates this phenomenon in the context of one of the most highdemand segments of the economy, accounting for the types of jobs individuals take. Our findings suggest that policies aimed at providing more STEM education opportunities for women will not necessarily reduce the STEM wage gap if women with STEM degrees continue to take jobs in the periphery instead of the core once they finish their education.
The question of why workers take these jobs remains open. There are several approaches to answering the question, which must decompose several supply and demand factors. In a companion paper to follow this study, using the same ALP data, we take a bottom-up approach to answering this question by asking workers directly why they do or do not work in STEM, with a particular focus on those who have STEM degrees.
A key limitation to this study is that in using self-reported, subjective appraisals of jobs, our classification of the STEM workforce is inherently influenced by differences across individuals in beliefs and interpretations of what is and what is not STEM. Even with the instructions provided to sample members, we anticipate that variation in familiarity with and a conceptual understanding of STEM will yield heterogeneity in subjective appraisals of whether or not one's job is in fact STEM. This is affected by the general societal emphasis on STEM and could change over time. Heterogeneity in interpretation of our prompt could be a partial explanation for the observed gender differences, if women are more likely than men to consider the same job in a non-STEM occupation as STEM. Separating out whether the change in the gender gap comes from heterogeneity in beliefs, a desire to self-classify as STEM because it is emphasized in society, or simply from uncovering STEM jobs missed by top-down classifications, has important policy implications.
In closing, as the economy becomes increasingly reliant on workers with strong quantitative and analytical skills, there is a growing need for workers, educators, employers, and policymakers to identify the most efficient ways to engage the school-to-work pipeline of STEM talent that can support an expanding, innovative STEM economy. Our study has highlighted one key difference between men and women, and overall has highlighted the phenomenon that STEM skills and training are applied in an array of occupations that fall outside the traditional boundaries of STEM. Given that women are more concentrated in these peripheral occupations, any effort to close the gender gap in STEM employment needs to consider variation in the ways that men and women sort into STEM training and employment.
